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OPENING EXERCISES.
On Oct. 24th, the Law School held its
annual opening exercises in the large lecture room. There were present all of the
members of the faculty and most of the
old and new men. Dr. Reed, with his
usual force and excellence, addressed the
students at some length. Dr. Trickett
was then introduced, and, while declining
to speak at that time, announced that he
would address the Juniors the next day,
taking for his text" the first twelve pages
of Tiedeman on Real Property." A few
brief and much appreciated remarks were
made by Judge Sadler to the effect that a
lawyer's most valuable asset is a reputation for integrity. Senator Weakley spoke
briefly, and, as usual, had the hearts as
well as the ears of his auditors. There
have been no changes in the faculty, and
the other members announced the work
assigned for the following day. The
Junior class, while smaller in numbers
than it has been in former years, owing to
the new Supreme Court rule, is composed
of men of more liberal training than has
been the case in some former years. So,
while the new rule will perhaps for a time
diminish the attendance upon all law

schools in the State, the ultimate result
should be a higher standard of scholar
ship.
LITERARY SOCIETY.
On Friday evening, Oct. 16th, an important change was effected by the literary
societies of the school. Formerly two separate organizations have been maintained,
but during the past year, owing to a lack
of time, the members were unable to do
the work necessary to bring the meetiligs
up to the standard of excellence they desired. So, after due deliberation, the conclusion was reached that the best interests
of each society would be subserved by
uniting, and hereafter conducting the
meetings under the name of the Dickinson-Allison Society. Pursuant to this, a
joint meeting was held and resolutions to
this effect adopted, and the following officers elected to serve the ensuing month:
President-Wolfe.
Vice-President-Schwartzkoph.
Treasu rer-Reno.
Secretary-Mfenges.
Sergeant-at-Arms-Jones.
Executive Committee--(Seniors) Flynn,
Benjamin and James.
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DELTA CHI.
Following their usual custom, the local
chapter of this fraternity gave a reception
and smoker to the membersof the Junior
class, at their rooms, on Saturday evening
last.
The last issue of the Delta Chi Quarterly,
in referring to Delta Chi's in Chicago,
speaks very complimentary of Professor
Woodward, of "Cornell" chapter, who
was affiliated with Dickinson chapter
while on this faculty.
Among the new chapters recently installed are Georgetown University and
University of Chicago.
The local chapter have pledges of three
new men-Laub, Bowman and McAlee.
THETA LAMBDA PHI.
The law fraternity, Theta Lambda Phi,
opened their new home, at 150 W. Louther
street, on October 1st. During the summer the interior was thoroughly renovated
to suit its present purpose.
The building is a three-story brick, contaning fourteen rooms, with a small
portico extending from the second story
rea r.
Tli e first floor of the building is devoted
to parlor, library, meeting and smoking
rooms, while the second and third floors
will be used for study rooms and dormitorY purposes.
Nuch credit is due for the initial success of this house movement to the alumni
and honorary members of Holmes chapter.
Arrangements are under way to hold a
house warming some time during the preset term.
Among the new men who have associated themselves with the above are Paul
Mengis, '05, Leo McDonald, '05, John
Henneke, '05, Ralph C. Jack, '06, and Morgan Owen, '06.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Adams B. Vera, '03, was last June admitted to practice in McKean county, and
is now in New York City.
Leroy B. C. Delaney, '03, is associated
with Scandrett& Barnett,one of the largest
law firms in Pittsburg.
Anthony T. Walsh, '03, was admitted to
the bar of Luzerne county last June.

H. Spencer Vastine, '03, is registered in
the office of W. K. West, Danville, Montour county, and expects to take the State
Board examination next December.
Thos. B. Wilson is engaged in general
practice in Bradford, Pa.
Samuel B. Kaufman, '03, is registered in
the office of Win. T. Rourke, Reading, and
expects to take the State Board examination in December.
Carroll ]H. Keelor, '03, is in Santa Barbara, California, and expects to locate there
permanently.
Chas. F. Hickernell, '03, passed the State
Board examination last June, and applied
for ad mission in Lebanon county, October
26, 1903.
Win. A. Shoino, '03, is registered with
Stevens & Stevens, Reading, and expects
to take the State Board examination, December 8th and 9th.
Victor B. Bouton, '03, has formed a partnership with F. D. Gallup, Esq., at Sjnethport, Pa. Mr. Bouton has already been
engaged in two homicide cases, in one of
which, unassisted, he acquitted his client,
and in the other assisted the district attorney in securing a conviction.
Clifford D. Jones, '03, is registered in the
office of ex-Judge A. V. Barker, Ebensburg, Cambria county, and intends taking
his preliminary examinationin thatcounty
next November. Cambria is one of the
few counties which has not adopted the
Supreme Court rules.
Alvin Sherbine, '03, is registered in the
office of Robert S. Murphy, Johnstown,
Cambria county, and intends taking his
preliminary examination next November.
Walter S. Bishop, '03, intends locating
in Philadelphia, where he will take his
final examination for admission to the bar
in December.
Albert S. Longbottom, '03, was admitted
to the bar of Delaware county last June.
A. Irving Yeagley, '03, passed the State
Board examination last June.
Fred. B. Gerber, '03, entered the Harvard Law School this fall to take the
three-year course.
Paul A. A. Core, '03, is in the revenue
office at Pittsburg.
John F. Watsnd, '03, has located in
Bloomsburg, Columbia county.
D. Lloy'd Claycomb, '03, is admitted to
the bar and located in Bedford, Pa., where
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he is associated with Hon. John M.
Reynolds, who was Assistant Secretary of
the Interior during Cleveland's last administrat ion.
1. S. Peightel, '03, and R. M. Wright,
'03, have gone to Seattle, Washington,
where they expect to locate permanently.
They, iu company with Robert J. Boryer,
took the examination at Olympia for admission in that State, October 23d. Mr.
Boryer and Mr. Wright have formed a
partnership.
George B. Geary, '01, successfully passed
the StateBar examination at Philadelphia.
Edison B. Williamson, '03, is in York,
and will take the county examination this
fall.
J. Mechesney Ebbert, '03, is in Waynesboro, preparing for the York county examination.
Harvey A. Gross, '03, of Hall, is preparing for the York County Bar examination.
Chas. H. Drumheller, '03, is pursuing his
legal studies at Harrisburg.
Charles Myers, '00, of Johnstown, Pa.,
was married this summer to Miss Nehn,
of the same place.
George Points, '02, of Bedford, was in
Carlisle and attended the opening of Law
School.
The FoRuM takes pleasure in announcing the engagement of Mr. Geo. B. Coles,
'99, and Miss Marvel, '00, of Atlantic City,
N.J.
Oct. 22nd, Mr. Win. E. Elmes, of the
class of '02, was married to Miss May Lillian Corkins, of Berwick, Pa.
CLASS NOTES.
The York Dispatch published the an.
nouncement of the admission of John A.
M. Rife, ex-'05, to the bar of West Virginia.
W. C. Chapman, ex-'04, of Georgeville,
Indiana county, intends taking the State
Board examination next June.
John E. Rauffenbart, ex-'05, is continuing his law studies in an office at his home
in Atlantic City, N. J.
Benjamin E. Rogers, ex-'05, is registered
in the office of James Scarlett, Danville,
where he is continuing his law work.
J. Mal. Gillespie, '04, passed his final
examination at Sunbury last June, and
was admitted to practice in Northumberland county.

Edwin B. Morgan, ex-'05, has entered
the law school of the University of Pennsylvania.
Marion D. Patterson, ex-05, is continuing his studies in Pittsburg.
The officers elected by the Middle class
for the ensuing year are as follows: Wolf,
President; McNeil, Vice President; Jacobs,
Treasurer; Schwarzkoff, Secretary; Reno,
Historian.
CAMPUS NOTES.
The Law School is represented in the
Dickinson College football squad by Carlin, Amerman, Furgeson and Setzer.
The games played thus far have resulted
as follows: Sept. 19th, Dickinson, 48, Albright, 0; Sept. 26th, University of Pennsylvania, 27, Dickinson, 0; Oct. 7th, Dickinson, 23, Mercersburg, 5; Oct. 10- West
Point, 12, Dickinson, 0; Oct. 17th, Annapolis, 5, Dickinson, 0; Oct. 24th, Dickinson, 18, Franklin and Marshall, 6.

MOOT COURT.
BOYER vs. FARMERS BANK.
Deposit the property of thirdperson-Dishonor of depositor'scheck -Implied contract to honor same-Assumpsitfordamages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff deposited one hundred dollars
in bank notes with the defendant bank,
which issued to him a deposit book with
the credit given.
Plaintiff later gave a check to Brown on
defendant bank for $25, which Brown presented to bank for payment.
The latter refused to honor the check on
the ground it had discovered the money
in bank did not belong to Boyer, but that
title was in a third person.
Boyer now sues the bank for the above
default. This is assumpsit..
HASSERT and EHLER for plaintiff.
Refusal to honor depositor's check is
against public policy. First National Bank
of Look Haven v. Mason, 95 Pa. 113; Citizens' National Bank v. Alexander, 120 Pa.
476; Patterson v. Marine National Bank,
130 Pa. 419.
Bank cannot dispute right of depositor
in absence of claim of real owner. Hemphill v. Yerkes, 132 Pa. 545.
LONG and REESER for defendant.
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The credit on the books of the bank is
but prima facie evidence of ownership.
Harrisburg Bank v. Tyler, 3 W. & S. 373;
Frazier v. The Erie Bank, 8 W. & S. 18;
Jackson v. The Bank of the United States,
10 Barr 61 ; The Bank of Northern Liberties v. Jones, 6 Wright 541.
A deposit may be shown to belong to a
third person. Arnold et al. v. Macungie
Savings Bank, 21 P. F. S. 290; Stair v.
York National Bank, 5 P. F. S. 368.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff deposited $100 in bank notes
with the defendant bank, which issued to
him a deposit book with credit given.
Plaintiff later gave a check to Brown on
defendant bank for $25, which Brown presented to the bank for payment. The latter refused to honor the check on the
ground that it had discovered the money
in the bank did not belong to Boyer, but
that the title was in a third person.
Boyer now sues the bank for the above
default.
In other words Boyer sues the bank for
damages which have resulted by the bank's
refusal to honor his check.
It has been held by a line of Pennsylvania cases beginning with First National
Bank of Lock Haven v. Mason, 95 Pa. 113,
that "it would be clearly against public
policy to permit a bank that has received
money from a depositor, credited him
therewith upon its books, and thereby entered into an implied contract to honor his
checks, to allege that the money deposited
belonged to some one else. This may be
done by an attaching creditor, or by the
true owner of the fund; but the bank is
estopped by its own act."
Now, what have we in this case? Have
we any allegations by a supposed owner of
the fund, or any attachment by the creditors of Boyer? No, we have neither.
The bank refused to honor the check simply on the ground that it had discovered
the money in bank did not belong to
Boyer, but that title was in a third person.
Maybe one of the clerks of the ban k heard
it at his boarding-house, or the watchman
of the bank was told of it by his next door
neighbor, or it may have been discovered
from one of many other unreliable sources;
but certainly we cannot imply from the
statement of the case that the bank had
any legal notice of the money not belonging to Boyer. It would, indeed, be a dangerous practice if banks were allowed to

take deposits to the extent of thousands of
dollars, and then, on the plea that they
had discovered it belonged to some one
else, refuse to hand over the money on demand by those entitled to it. We think
the natural consequence of such a ruling
would be that every one would turn banker,
and that there would be a scarcity of depositors.
In Citizens' Bank v. Alexander, 120 Pa.
476, the deputy county treasurer deposited
money as deputy treasurer, and the bank
refused to pay over the balance due on his
account on the ground that the county
treasurer had overdrawn his account as
county treasurer, and that the balance due
the deputy was used to make good the deficiency. Justice Paxton, in deciding this
case, applied the principles in 95 Pa. 113,
supra, and held that even though the
bank was morally certain that the money
deposited by the treasurer and deputy
treasurer came out of the same fund,
yet they had no right to appropriate
the deposit of the deputy treasurer,
and refuse to honor his check, and set up
as a defense that the money deposited belonged to some one else; but that the bank
could not refuse to honor such check, unless at the demand of an attaching creditor or the true owner of the fund.
Both these above cases were recognized
as the law in Patterson v. Marine Bank,
130 Pa. 419,and in Hemphill et a~v. Yerkes
et al., 132 Pa. 545.
Having satisfied ourselves that the bank
was wrong in dishonoring Boyer's check,
let us consider the damages recoverable by
Boyer. In First National Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. 102, it is ruled that if the
depositor's check is wrongfully dishonored he may sue the bank to recover damages for dishonoring his check, or he may
bring an action of assumpsitto recover the
amount of his deposit as for money had
and received. In a much later case, Patterson v. Marine Bank, 130 Pa. 443, it is
held that there is something more than a
breach of a contract in cases such as the
one under consideration: that there is
a question of public policy involved, and
a breach of an implied contract, for which
the depositor may not only recover nominal damages, but substantial damages as
well.
We are inclined to agree with the doc-
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trine laid down in 130 Pa. 443, supra,and
therefore think it a matter for the jury in
this case to decide what substantial damages Boyer has suffered, and render their
verdict accordingly.
J. HOWARD JACOBS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

We agree with the opinion of the learned
court below. The money, $100, was deposited by Boyer in the bank. It refused
to honor his check for $25, payable to
Brown. No contract with Brown was
thus broken, and he could not effectively
sue the bank. But, when the bank received Boyer's deposits it expressly or impliedly promised to pay out the money to
Boyeror his nominee, on his written order.
For its refusal to do so he has a right Of
action.
The bank's excuse for not honoring
Boyer's check was its discovery that the
5100 helonged to a third person. Information to it that the money belonged to another, if untrue, could surely not excuse
its refusal to pay the checks of Boyer.
Nor would the fact that the money belonged to another, and that the bank
knew the fact before paying. The true
owner might claim the money by suit and
so excuse the bank from honoring Boyer's
check; or he might otherwise demand
it, with the same result. Hemphill v.
Yerkes, 132 Pa. 545.
But, in the absence of any claim by the
real owner, the bank is bound to honorthe
depositor's check. Burger v. Burger, 135
Pa. 449; Penna, T. & T. Co. v. Meyer, 201
Pa. 299. See cases cited by the learned
court below.
Judgment affirmed.

WILLIAM JACOBS vs. ALFRED
MOULTON.
Negligence-Parental consent to minor's
employment-Father's right to tort
action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Alfred Moulton employed in his mill the
fourteen year old son of Jacobs without the
latter's knowledge or consent. The father
supposed the son to be with his uncle.
The work was hazardous. The boy was
painfully hurt in operating the machine;
the injury was due to his own negligence;

the defendant Moulton was not guilty of
any contributory negligence. The father
now sues for the loss of services, nurse and
doctor hire. Amount, S500.
SETZER and HENNEKE for plaintiff.
An employer must employ competent
employees, and such employees have a
right to rely upon the care and superior
knowledge of their employer. Gilman v.
Easton R. R. Co., 95 Miss. 433, 7 L. R. A.
173; 95 N. Y. 546.
Contributory negligence as well as the
employee's knowledge of risks connected
with the employment, is a question for the
jury. Oakland R. R. Co. v. Fielding, 48
Pa. 320, 4 L. R. A. 242.
RAUFFENBART and MENGES for defendant.
Plaintiff in order to recover must show
negligence on the part of the employer.
McMillan et at. v. Union News Co., 144
Pa. 332; Zurn v. Tetlow, 134 Pa. 213; Hidsey v. Toffe, 105 N. Y. 26.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

We think, in view of the above facts,
that the plaintiff should be non-suited.
The fact that the defendant employed the
boy without the knowledge of the parents
does not make him liable in damages for
the injuries which he sustained. In order
that the plaintiff may recover Li a case of
this kind, he must prove negligence on the
part of the defendant. This case is very
similar to McMillan v. Union News Co.,
144 Pa. 332. Here, the News Co , without
the plaintiff's consent, employed the
plaintiff's son, an intelligent youth in his
sixteenth year, to sell goods on passenger
trains. Failing to obey the instructions
of The News Co. he was killed and the
father brought suit against the company,
but was non-suited, as no negligence was
shown against the defendant.
The age of the plaintiff's son in this
case, being fourteen years, is in law conSidered the age of discretion, so the fact
that he is a minor does not alter the rule
which is: that where an employee accepts
employment, the dangers of which are apparent, he assumes the risks incident to
that employment.
We think the plaintiff, although he did
not have knowledge of his son's employnment at the hazardous work, was, nevertheless, guilty of contributory negligence,
as it was his duty to know at what kind
of work his minor son was employed. It
was held, in Smith v. Hestonville. etc.,
Railway Co., 92 Pa. 450, to be contributory
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negligence per se for a plaintiff to permit
her child to engage in a dangerous employment where the age of the child was not
yet that of discretion. However, we do
not think it necessary in this case for the
defendant to show this contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff for the
facts clearly state that the defendant was
guilty of no negligence and the law isvery
clear on the point that the plaintiff can
not recover unless he shows negligence
on the part of defendant.
The Factory Act of 1897, which is a
penal statute, makes it unlawful to hire or
employ any child under the age of sixteen
years unless there is first provided and
placed on file an affidavit made by the
parent or guardian, stating the age, date
and place of birth of said child, but we
have nothing to do with this as the case
now under consideration is a civil action.
In view of the facts submitted, considered in the light of the law as we see ft,
the plaintiff is duly non-suited.
JOS. J. KNAPPENBERGER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The action is by the boy's father against
his employer. It is found, in the special
verdict, that Mioulton was not negligent.
Then, for what reason is he liable? He
was not negligent, therefore he did not
omit to instruct the boy as to the hazardous nature of the business; nor did he employ the boy under circumstances under
which he should not have employed him;
nor did he set him to operate a machine
which he should not have been required
to operate.
It does appear that the boy was hired
without the knowledge of the father. The
father has a species of ownership of the
boy, is entitled to his earning power, and
has a right to control that power. But the
complaint is not that the father was deprived of the wages of the boy. We know
not whether he got them or not. A boy
may"properly be employed, and the father
intended that his son should be, and supposed that he was, employed at his uncle's.
What work he was supposed to be doing at
the uncle's is not revealed, nor whether
it was less or more hazardous than that at
which Moulton employed him.
Moulton should have obtained the consent of the father to the employment of
the son, but the mere fact that he did not

did not make him an insurer of the boy's
safety. 144 Pa. 332. If the work was
what a boy might properly do, and nothing shows that it was not, no wrong was
committed by Moulton towards Jacobs
that can be redressed in this action. Cf.
Zurn v. Tetlow, 134 Pa. 213; O'Keefe v.
Thorn, 24 W. N. 0. 379; McMillan v.
Union News Co., 144 Pa. 332.
Judgment affirmed.
WHITE vs. WILKINS.
Trespass-Liabilityof master for the negligence of his servants-Bodily injury
caused by means of fright actionableRule of proximate and remote cause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Defendant's servant while driving the
defendant's carriage, in the course of his
business, negligently drove through the
window of the room in which the plaintiff was sitting. There was no physical
contact, but the plaintiff suffered such a
nervous shock and fright as to result in a
miscarriage, causing great and dangerous
sickness, pecuniary loss, loss of time, etc.
She now wishes in this action to recover
damages for her injuries. The miscarriage
occurred one month after the negligence.
WILLIAMSON

for plaintiff.

A master is responsible for injuries to
third persons caused by the negligence of
his servants while acting in the course of
their employment. P. R. R. Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. 365; McFarlan v. P. R. R.
Co., 199 Pa. 408.
There can be a recovery where no bodily
injury has been inflicted. Purcell v. St.
P. R. R. Co., 16 L. R. A. 203; Ritch v.
Sanders, 2 Forum 35; Oliver v. Laville, 36
Wis. 596.
The damages are not too remote to prevent a recovery, because they can be ineasured by physical effect.
WATSON

and

KAUFMAN*

for defendant.

Mental anguish or distress may be considered with physical injury; but in the
present case there was no physical contact.
[zeading cases hold that mental distress of
itself js not a ground of action. Mitchell v.
R. R. Co., 151 N. Y. 167; Spade v. Lynn,
etc., 166 Mass. 290; Ewingv. R. R. Co., 147
Pa. 44.
The injury here alleged was unintentional on the part of the defendant. Such
injuries do not draw after them remote or
speculative damages. 61 Pa. 302.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action is brought by Mrs. White
against Wilkins to recover damages for a
miscarriage and pecuniary loss caused by
the negligence of Wilkins' servant. It is
admitted that there was no physical contact, but the fright occasioned by the servant in driving through the window resulted in the injury conplained of.
As there was no evidence of any other
cause for a miscarriage we must assume
that the fear was the medium through
which it was caused. There are several
cases that hold that the fear itself, considered as an effect, is not a cause of action.
On the other hand many cases maintain
responsibility for effects produced b.y fear.
In Benner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, it
was held that "the defendant was not
liable for the miscarriage of a woman
caused by her fright at the shooting of a
dog near her, because it was not a consequence which the defendant ought tb have
foreseen." Neither could the defendant's
servant in this case foresee the consequences of his act, but his act was such a
grossly negligent one and the circumstances so radically different from the
Minnesota case that we cannot see how
the principle in the latter case can apply.
In Vol. 2 Forum 35, it was held that
there could be arecovery where the defendant fired a gun in the direction of the
.plaintiff who was only a sh6rt distance
away, which so frightened him that symptoms of mania followed; on the grounds
that "the mania was the result of the firing of the gun, through the fear which it
engendered."2 "That the defendant did
not anticipate the result is irrelevant."
"For the purpose of fixing liability for a
torf no inquiry is permitted into what the
defendant did or did not anticipate."
Pittsburg v. Green, 22 Pa. 54.
"Fear taken alone falls short of being
actlal damage, not because it is remote or
unlikely consequence, but because it can
be proved and measured only by physical
effects." Pollock Torts 57.
In Purcell v. St. Paul Ry. Co., 16 L. R.
A. 203, negligence resulted in fright and
a miscarriage followed; it was held that
"there could be a recovery as the fright
could be measured by the effects."
We think that the injury was the natural
consequence of the negligent act.

"The master is liable for the conduct of
his servant within the course of his employment." McFarlan v. P. R. R., 199
Pa. 408.
Judgment for plaintiff for full amount
claimed.
WRIGHT, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The defendant's servant negligently
drove his carriage through the window of
the room in which Mrs. White was sitting.
It is unnecessary to cite authorities for the
principle that the act of the servant will
be imputed to the master, and the latter
be held responsible for it.
Two results of the negligence followed;
a damage to the house and its furniture
and a damage to the person of Mrs. White.
For some reason, perhaps because the
house and property did not belong to her,
no damages for the injury to them are
sought in this action.
There was no contact of the horse or
carriage with Mrs. White. She was so
affrighted, however, that a miscarriage resulted, accompanied with a "great and
dangerous sickness." The defendant contends that he is responsible for no damage
connected as aconsequence by the medium
of fear, with the negligent running into
the house, as a cause.
In Ritch v. Sanders, 2 Forum 35, we had
occasion to investigate this question. In
Mitchell v. Railway Co., 151 N. Y. 107,
the court of errors of New York, assuming
that fright, negligently caused, would not
alone be a ground for damages, asserts that
it is for that reason "obvious that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting
therefrom." We briefly suggested that
the conclusion was a palpable non sequitur.
There are often chains of effects for the last
of which the orginator of the series is responsible, while he would not be for the
intermediate, were they not followed by
the last. It requires but ordinary imagination to recall them. A horse may be
frightened into running or plunging into
peril. Surely the fright, apart from the
consequence, is not a cause of action. Just
as surely, the effect of it, connected, as the
effect is, by means of it, with the negligent
act, is a cause of action. Vide cases cited in
2 Forum 35. Indeed we can scarcely be
patient at the utterance of so palpable an
error.
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Spadev. Lynn, etc., R. R., 166 Mass. 290,
also repudiates responsibility for the pysical results of mental disturbances, "where
there is no injury to the person from without." This is a purely arbitrary doctrine.
The only justification of it is the difficulty
of proof of the fright, or of tle physical
injury being the consequence of it. But
there are cases in which no such difficulty
exists. The case before us is one of them.
The accident occurs; it is followed by the
signs of fright and by miscarriage. Does
any rational man doubt the sequence of
the latter upon the former? It is a confession of imbecility to say that, because,
in many cases, it is doubtful whether the
alleged fright existed, or whether its
alleged consequences were its consequences, therefore, even in the cases in
which there can be no doubt of the fright
and the consequences, there shall be no
responsibility.
The case of Ewing v. P. C. & St. L. Ry.
Co., 147 Pa. 40, is cited as authority.
The
plaintiff alleged the negligent
collision of cars with her house, great
fright and alarm and nervous excitement,
resulting in sickness and disability. The
following are the objections to her recovery,
alleged by the Supreme Court:
(1.) The scope of accident cases would
be very greatly enlarged. That is, apparently, mere fright alone will not be a cause
of action. (2.) The defendant owed the
plaintiff no duty not to frighten her. (3.)
It owed her no duty to anticipate that
fright would follow from its negligence,
and in turn be followed by corporal injury.
The cases cited are pertinent to the first of
these propositions only. The other two
are left wholly unsupported.
(1.) It is the business of courts to administer justice. If fright alone were a
substantial injury, what good reason could
there be for not compensating for it when
the defendant's negligence has caused it?
Only the difficulty of furnishing safe proof
of its existence and its degree. This difficulty, we concede, would be a justification
for refusing redress. The testimony of the
plaintiff would be well nigh conclusive,
and the gravest oppressions might follow
from the admission of fright alone, as a
cause for damages.
(2.) Of course, if fright alone is not to
be a cause of action, it practically follows

that the second proposition is true. The
defendant can owe no duty for the nonperformance of which the law imposes on
him no responsibility.
(3.) But why did the defendant owe no
duty to anticipate that fright would follow
the negligence, and in turn be followed by
corporal injury? Is it because the defendant was under no duty to anticipate that
his servant's negligence would cause the
horse to run into the house? Then there
could, for the same reason, be no damages
recovered for the injury to the house or furniture. Is it because the defendant was
not bound to foresee that if the vehicle was
driven into the house there might be an
enceinte woman in the house, and that if
so she might take fright? Is it because
the defendant was not bound to foresee
that the result of the fright of an enceinte
woman might be a miscarriage, and other
grave physical consequences? The fact
is, that the decision in Ewing v. R. R. Co.
supra, if it be relevant here, is not
authority for the principle that one who
negligently causes fright is not responsible
for the consequences of that fright, but
only for the principle that when the consequences of fright "could not have been
reasonably foreseen," the accident was not
the proximate cause of them.
That the "proximate cause" of a phenomenon is equivalent to one from the
moment of whose happening, a witness of
it or the agent who produces it, ean foresee that phenomenon, is a proposition
which it would be difficult to sustain by
authority or by logic. Cases are well nigh
innumerable in which the capacity to foresee the event has not been adopted as the
best of responsibility for it; nor as the test
of the proximateness of the cause to the
effect. But we cannot pursue this discussion. We lay down the following propositions:
(1.) 3 does not owe to A the duty of not
frightening him, but he does owe to A the
duty of not causing bodily harm to him by
means of the fright, whether that fright
produce its effects by direct modification
of the nervous system and other organs, or
by precipitating A through spontaneous
muscular action into danger.
(2.) The miscarriage of an enceinte
woman, sitting in a house into which
the defendant's horse and carriage are
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driven, is not too remote to be the gravamen of an action:
Judgment affirmed.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

We conceive two questions to be involved
in the present case. First, as to the liability
of the defendant in leaving his horse unattended and unhitched on the public
JOHN LEWIS vs. PHILIP HIGGINS.
highway while he was in the performance
XNe.qlgence-Liabilily of owner of untied of his duties, and second as to the act of
horse-Justfiable circumstances-Duty the plaintiff in attempting to ride between
of rider of bicycle or other vehicle-Con- the ice wagon and the curb-a space of five
feet.
tributory negligence.
In regard to the first point, the plaintiff
alleges it wasprimafacie,if not gross negliSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Higgins was delivering ice to customers gence for the defendant to have his horse
along a street of the borough of C* unattended and unhitched in the street,
His custom was to let the horse stand un- and as the injury of the plaintiff was due
hitched while he carried the lumps of ice to this negligence of the defendant; the
to the door steps, and alleges. On a day in plaintiff is entitled to recover. In support
May, 1902, he was doing this, when Lewis, of this contention plaintiff cites the case
coming behind the wagon on a bicycle, of Kiopper v. Henry, 147 Pa. 178. In that
case the doctrine is laid down that the
was thrown down by the horse suddenly
turning toward the pavement, between act of leaving a horse unattended and unwhich and the position of the horse and hitched in the publichighwayis negligence
primafamieand puts the burden on the dewagon there was a space of five feet. In
thistrespass plaintiff alleges the negligence fendant to show it was not negligence. If
of the defendant in not hitching the horse there were circumstances to show the conand letting it stand so far away from the duct was justified it is for the defendant to
pavement. The horse was gentle, and had show them. If there were none the fact unfor three years been used as now and had explained would be enough to justify a vernot been known to turn around or start dict against him. It will be perceived the
defendant may show eircumstancesjustifywithout order.
ing his act, and if he can do so he is relieved
Fox and REESER for the plaintiff.
The burden being on plaintiff to show from liability. In this case he has shown
negligence (57 Pa., 374) and plaintiff makes it would greatly harass him in conducting
out aprimafaciecase, the burden shifts to his business, that of delivering ice, if he
the defendant to show contributory negli- should be obliged to tie up his horse when
gence.
"A person leaving his horse unfastened making his deliveries, and it would conor unattended in a public place is guilty of sume much of his time in untieing them
gross negligence, for which he is responsible when be was ready to start. He has
to a party injured, although the qualities further shown he was away from the wagon
and habits of the animal are such as to only for a short time, and that the horse
induce the belief of perfect safety in so
doing." Brown on Negligence, vol. 1, p. he was driving was gentle and never
795.
known to start or turn without orders.
Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. 188; Spring Co. While we think these facts seem to justify
v. Edgar, 99 U. S.654; Hays v. Miller, 77
the practice, yet we consider it a question
Pa. 241; Johnson v. West Chester Railway
of fact to be determined by the jury, As
Co., 70 Pa. 357.
was said in Klopper v. Henry, supra,
HEDGES and HELLER for defendant.
To-leave a horse unattended in a public "What the defendant did, under what cirstreet is only prima facie negligence, and cumstances he did it, and whether these
puts the burden of proof on defendant to circumstances relieved him from the charge
show circumstancesjustifying his conduct.
of negligence are questions of fact for the
Henry v. Klopper, 147 Pa. 178.
When a person has the choice of two jury."
ways, one of which is perfectly safe and
As to the second point, we think the law
the other is subject to risks and dangers, to be very clear and thoroughly settled.
and he voluntarily chooses the latter and
A bicycle is classed as a vehicle and has
is injured, he is guilty of contributory
negligence and cannot recover. Haven v. the same rights upon the highway as any
Pittsburg Bridge Co., 151 Pa. 620; Lynch other vehicle; also, we think the law to be
v. Erie, 151 Pa. 380.
that it is subject to the same obligations
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and duties as the other vehicles among
which it is classed. One who selects it as
a means of conveyance must look in front
of him and see where he is going and that
he does not run into anybody else. It is the
duty of one riding or driving on the highway to use his eyes and avoid colliding
with vehicles and pedestrians.
Disregarding the question as to whether
the defendant was negligent or not, we
think it cannot be denied that the plaintiff
saw the wagon standing on the road and
he also must have perceived the narrow
path between the wagon and the curb and
that it was perilous to attempt to ride
through this opening-a space of five feetwhen the boundary on one side was a horse
attached to a wagon.
We think it not at all unreasonable to
suppose the plaintiff realized his coming
suddenly in close proximity with the horse
would cause it to frighten and hence
render his position perilous, when, on the
other hand, he could, without any particular inconvenience, have steered his bicycle
to the other side of the road and thus have
avoided any danger of injury. Under the
circumstances we feel this was the duty of
the plaintiff and in disregarding it he was
guilty of contributory negligence. There
are several cases in Pennsylvania in which
this point has been discussed by the
Supreme Court. In Lrks. Twp. v. King,
84 Pa. 230, it was decided "A person who
voluntarily undertakes to test a defect in
the highway when it could have been
avoided is guilty of contributory negligence."
Tn Railway v. Taylor, 104 Pa306, it is held "A man is as much bound to
avoid a known danger on a public road as
anywhere else. If he can avoid the danger
he is bound to do so." The same doctrine
is laid down in Hill v. T'wp., 146 Pa. 11,
and in Lynch v. Erie City, 151 Pa. 380 it
is held "where a traveler is aware of the
dangerous condition of the highway and
is at liberty to choose another route which
is entirely safe, but fails to do so, he is guilty
of contributory negligence and cannot
recover for his injuries." While most of
the cases which have arisen were those in
which the owner of a horse and wagon
figured as the plaintiff, yet, as we have
seen, a bicycle is classed as a vehicle and
the same doctrine applies.
We think the test in such cases is: Was

the danger known or would observation
have disclosed it; and if a person voluntarily places himself in a position of known
danger, or which is likely to be perilous,
he is negligent and cannot recover no
matter what may be the negligence of the
other party. As we think the plaintiff
comes within this rule we enter a compulsory non-suit. Judgment accordingly.
FLYNN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREIE COURT.

In Henry v. Klopper, 147 Pa. 178, the
court said, not abstractly, that leaving a
horse unhitched in the street, is prima
facie negligent, but that Klopper's particular act, embracing the leaving of the
horse un hiteled wasprimafacienegligent.
In the case before us we have the circumstances revealed. The horse was gentle,
never known in three years to turn around
or start without order. Higgins did not
go far from the horse, nor where he did not
have him in view. He ran with the ice
to the doorstep and back to the wagon. It
would be error, when such facts are before
the jury, to tell them that the act of Hifgins was prima facie negligent. Whether
the jury should be allowed to say that it
was negligent is doubtful. We incline to
think that the facts being as they are, the
jury should not be allowed to say that they
involved negligence, and for this reason
no error was committed by the learned
court below in entering a nonsuit.
The ground alleged by the court below
for the nonsuit was the negligence of the
plaintiff. Between Higgins' wagon and
the pavement was a space of five feet.
Lewis. instead of turning to the space
between the wagon and the opposite side
of the street, attempted to ride through
the lane five feet wide, and while doing so
suffered the accident. This act the court
below has pronounced negligent. In so
doing we think it has transcended its
right. It does not appear how wide the
street was. If it was narrow, 14 or 15 feet
wide, the space on one side of the wagon
would not be substantially wider than that
on the other side. If the street was wider
there may have been other vehicles moving
over the wider space, so that the actual or
seeming danger of taking any other
course would have been as great as that of
taking the actual course.
The burden of showing Lewis' negli-
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gence was as much on Higgins as that of
showing Higgins' was on Lewis. When
the act done is or is not negligent according as there is or is not a combination of circumstances, some of these circumstances
are not to be disrupted from the rest. The
act of riding through the five foot space is
not to be separated from other attendant
circumstances and branded as primafacie
negligent in order to throw the burden of
proving the attendant circumstances on
Lewis. It was just as easy for Higgins to
prove these other circumstances as for
Lewis. The mere fact that Lewis had to
prove the act of riding between the wagon
and the curb, in order to recover, did not
make that fact prima facie evidence of
negligence and justify the court in holding
the plaintiff self-convicted of negligence.
Because we think it proper not to allow
a jury to brand as negligent, the disclosed
act of Higgins, under the circumstances,
judgment affirmed.
AMOS ELLIS vs. PENNA. R. R. CO.
Negtigence - Contributory negligence Right of action for death-Dictum on
right of administratorof mother.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The railroad and the road cross each
other at an angle of about twenty-five
degrees, and Ellis was driving with his
sister and mother southward toward this
crossing and a train was likewise moving
southward. The track is in acut and cars
on it are invisible from the road. At the
distance of several hundred feet from the
crossing and north of it the railroad bends
so that beyond the bend the engineer or
fireman could not see anything on the
crossing. Ellis stopped eight or ten feet
from the crossing, listened, heard nothing;
looked, saw nothing, and started to cross
the track. The fireman on the left side of
the cab of the engine first saw him, but
assuming that the engineer had done so did
not speak. The engineer at the right side
could not see him as quickly. The emergency brake was at once applied and the
train brought to a stop when the front of
the locomotive was twenty feet beyond the
crossing. It had struck the hind part of the
back wheel of the carriage, killing Ellis'
sister. This is trespass by Ellis for her
death.

WILLIS and SPENCER for plaintiff.
Objection to action as not being brought
by proper parties must be made by either
demurrer or answer; not done, it must be
deemed waived and may be disregarded.
Smith v. Hall, 67 N. Y. 50; Spooner v.
Delaware R. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 22; Conklin
v. Fox, 3 Mont. 208.
Claimed that only personal representatives could recover, action was maintained
by widow and minor children. Dahl v.
Tibbals, 5 Wash. 259.
Objection to parties to action must be
made at first opportunity. Kittlewell v.
Peters, 23 Md. 312; Miller v. Metzger, 16
Ill. 390.
Deceased "stopped, looked and listened."
Question on negligence is for the jury.
Elston v. Delaware R. R Co., 196 Pa. 596.
McGill v. R. R. Co., 152 Pa. 332.
BENJAMIN and LLOYD for defendant.
"The persons entitled to recover damages
for any injury causing death shall be the
husband, widow, children or parents of
the deceased, and no other relatives." Act
April 26, 1855, P. L., 309, sec. I.
This act determines in whom the right
of action is. Birch et al. v. P. C. 0. & St.
L. R. R. Co., 165 Pa. 3-49.
The mere act of stopping before attempting to cross a railroad track does not of
itself show that the person stopped at a
proper place or that the duty of looking
and listening ivas performed with pr.per
care and attention. Ely v. R. R., 158 Pa.
233; Holden v. R. R., 169 Pa. 1.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In order that the plaintiff in this action
may prevail three things must be shown:
first, that there was no contributory negligence upon the part of the deceased; second,
that the defendant was negligent; and
third, that Amos Ellis, the plaintiff, is
invested with authority to prosecute the
cause.
The question of negligence in this action
must be determined under the tests of the
"stop, look and listen" rule. At the cross-"
ings of streets and railroads the rights of
parties on each are concurrent, neither one
nor the other having the exclusive right of
way any more than parties have on the
public highways. Each owes it to the
other not to violate the mutual rights.
Each man must be thejudge of his ability
to cross a track ahead of a locomotive in
each particular instance. Seeing and hearing a train is a warning of danger and
nothing short of necessity compelling a
crossing in front of the train will overcome
the presumption of negligence which the
law imputes to such an act. If under
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these circumstances an accident occurs,
negligence is the presumption juris et de
jure and the victim is remediless. Myres v.
R. R., 150 Pa., 386. The duty of a traveler
to "stop, look and listen" is a legal one.
Dean v. P. R. R., 129 Pa. 514. And no
matter what the testimony, if a collision
results immediately upon a person going
upon the track, that fact conclusively
proves that he did not exercise proper care
to avoid the approaching train. Holden
v. P. R. R., 169 Pa. 1. Such contributory
negligence will entitle the defendant to a
nonsuit. Henze v. The St. Louis, Kansas
City and Northern R. R. Co., 71 Mo. 636;
R. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 702; P. R. R.
v. Mooney, 126 Pa. 244. Nor did the
fact that the deceased was a mere passenger
in the vehicle in any way relieve her from
her duty of care.
The conduct of the engineer in so promptly stopping the train negatives the hypothesis of negligence on his part, and without his negligence there could be no
r,covery,
Since the facts in this case are not in dispute, nor the inferences of law open to debate, and the evidence so conclusively
shows negligence on the part of both the
plaintiff and the deceased, the court cannot do otherwise than draw the conclusion
of contributory negligence and direct a.
nonsuit. R. R. v. Frantz, 127 Pa. 297;
McNeal v. R. R. Co., 131 Pa. 184.
We will now consider the third essential
to this action. The Act of April 26, 1855,
P. & L. 3234, provides that "The persons
entitled to recover damages for any injury
causing death shall be the husband,
widow, children or parents of the deceased, and no other relative."
The Constitution of 1874 did not abrogate this act, in fact it confirms the act
under the provision that "The right of
action shall survive and the General Assembly shall provide for whose benefit
such actions shall be prosecuted."
Brooks
v. Borough of Danville, 95 Pa. 158. The
law is explicit. Amos Ellis belongs to the
class of "other relatives" and is not entitled to recover.
Judgment of nonsuit is therefore entered
for defendant, with costs.
Yocum, J.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

We should find it difficult to reach the
conclusion announced by the learned trial
court, that, on the facts disclosed, there was
contributory negligence by the deceased,
and that for this reason the plaintiff must
be nonsuited. Whether there was such
negligence or not was for the jury. Ellis
stopped at the distance of eight or ten feet
from the crossing. Was that too near, or
too far? Who but the jury could say?
Should he have got out of the carriage and
advanced to the track? Who but the
jury could say? But had he got out,
would he have heard any better? Nothing shows that he would. Would he have
seen the train? We know not. The carriage was not struck till it had nearly
cleared the track; so that, had the plaintiff
got out and looked the train would probably have been, when he looked for it,
where he could not have seen it. At all
events, it was for the jury to say whether
he could have seen it. As there was a
bend in the tracks any one proposing to
cross it had to rely chiefly o,. his hearing.
His sight extended nof sufficiently far to
discover the train so early that it would
not overtake him before he fully crossed.
But it is unnecessary to deliberate longer
on this aspect of the case.
At common law no man had a right to
the exemption of his own or even of another's life from abbreviation by the act of
another. If A was hurt by B he could sue
B, but the action abated on his death,
whether in consequence of the hurt or of
some other cause. This action is protected
from abatement by the 18th section of the
Act of April 15, 1851, 2 P. & L. 32-91. The
administrator of A, who was killed by the
hurt, could not originate an action until
the passage of this act. He could, under
that act, originate it only when no widow
suvived the deceased. The Act of April
26, 1855, 2 P. & L. 3234, gives a right to
sue to the surviving husband or widow of
the deceased, or, there being none, to his
or her children, or, there being none, to
lhis or her parents, and to "no other relative." The mother of Miss Ellis had the
right of action, and possibly if she is now
dead, (this does not appear), her administrator has it, but the brother is not of the
class on whom the right of action is conferred.
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The 21st section of Art. III of the Constitution of Pennsylvania ordains that "in
case of death from such injuries, the right
of action shall survive and the General
Assembly shall prescribe for w hose benefit
such actions shall be prosecuted."
Whether, under the provision, the brother
would have had a right of action, had the
mother not survived, it is Useless to inquire.
In the actual case, the legislature has
prescribed by whom the action may be
brought. It is the mother.
Judgment affirmed.
STONE CRUSHER CO. vs. BOROUGH
OF OXFORD.
Borough counjil's contracts-Necessityof
an ordinance-Quantummeruit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Borough Council at a regular session, by
a motion passed, instructed the road committee of said council to purchase a stone
crusher, and said committee entered into
a contract with the Stone Crusher Company for the machine, price $2,000, and
the committee of the council signed the
contract as also did the secretary.
Borough orders were issued to the Stone
Crusher Company to the number of five,
one order falling due each year for five
years, including interest.
When the first order became due, a new
council had been elected and they refused
to honor the orders.
The machine was delivered and used by
the borough for a few days and was then
put away in the borough building, where
it still remains.
The Stone Crusher Company sue on
these orders and the council sets up as one
defense that the purchase of the machine
was an unusual and extraordinary expenditure, and as such must be presented to
the council in the form of a resolution and
must have the endorsement of the burgess
before it was legal. Also that one council
cannot bind future councils to pay for this
purchase.
HILLYER and LOURIMER for plaintiffs.
Council had power to make such a contractas it was in line of its duties. Triekett
on Borough Law, p. 224; A. & E. Enc.,
1st ed., vol. 15, p. 1080.

Even if proceeding to make contract was
irregular, nevertheless the council is bound
on an implied contract. McGuire v. Rapid
City, 5 L. R. A., 752; 86 Pa. 271; 14 Pa. 81;
176 Pa. 439.
If council seeks to rescind the contract,
plaintiff must be placed in statu qio.
Dewey v. Erie Borough, 14 Pa. 213; Summerv. Ritchie, 30 Pa. 147.
COOK and JACOBS for defendants.
All unusual expenditures of money in
behalf of a borough must be authorized by
Parish v. Wilkes-Barre, 2
ordinance.
Kulp 182; Wain v. Philadelphia 99 P&330; Rennes Appeal, 100 Pa. 182; Borough
of Mauch Chunk v. Shortz, 61 Pa. 339.
No ordinance or resolution enacted by
the council of a town will be valid unless
signed by the burgess. P. & L. Digest,
vol I, col. 274.
When contract is prohibited by statute,
or declared void by same, retention of
-goods under such contract does not subject
municipality to liability on quantum
meruit. 59 Mich. 311; 28 Ill. 490; 128 Ill.
443.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

By theActof 1884,Aprill, P.L. 163, see.8,
borough councils are given the power to
regulate, repair and keep in order the
roads, streets, lanes, alleys and other public grounds, wharves -or landings, within
said borough. The act not only authorizes
the council to repair and improve the
streets of the borough, but, by implication,
empowers such council to engage labor
and purchase materials for the purpose of
making such repairs and improvements.
Trickett, in his work on Pennsylvania
Borough Law, sec. 181, states the law tobe
as follows: "The power to contract is incidental to the other powers of a borough.
As it may employ certain officers, fixing
their salaries; as it may lay out, widen,
grade, pave and curb streets; as it may
light its streets, and provide a supply of
water for its inhabitants, and do many
other things, the doing of which Implies
the securing of materials and the employment of the agency of others; itmay make
the contracts presupposed in the performauce of these functions." From this it can
easily be-seen that the borough council in
this case had a right to enter into a contract for the purchase of a stone crusher,
provided it made such contract in a proper
way and not in an irregular use of its
power. The question for us to decide,
then, is this: Did the borough council
enter into this contract in the manner pre-
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scribed by law, so as to make it valid and
of binding effect upon the borough ?
It is contended on the part of the defendant borough that the purchase was an
unusual and extraordinary expenditure,
and as such must be presented to the
council in the form of a resolution, and
must have the endorsement of the burgess
before it is legal. This contention, we
think, is valid and is supported by ample
authority. Says Trickett, in his work on
Pennsylvania Borough Law, see. 181:
"Contracts of an unusual and important
kind must be made by ordinance." "The
decision of the courts," says Judge Craig,
in Riche v. Borough of Lansford, 18 C. C.
294, 'seem to be to the effect that all acts of
councils which involve the expenditure of
public money, or which relate to the gov
ernment or regulation of the affairs of the
corporation, must be authorized by ordinance." Thus, in Milford Borough v.
Water Co., 124 Pa. 623, it issaid by Paxson,
Chief Justice, that neither councils, nor
the officers of a municipality, can contract in any other way than by ordinance,
and that it is one of the safeguards of
municipal corporations, that they can be
bound only by contracts authorized by
ordinance, duly passed. In Com. exvel, v.
Buchanan, 6 Kulp 217, it is decided that
a town council, in the absence of any ordinance upon the subject, cannot authorize
the execution of any c6ntract for lighting
streets. In Kepner v. Com., 40 Pa. 124, it
is held that an ordinance is necessary to
renew a loan already owed by the city.
In Sower v. City, 35 Pa. 231, it is said that
an ordinance is necessary for the opening
of a street. In Marshall v. Mayor, 59 Pa.
455, it is held that, before councils can revoke a contract for grading streets and
enter into a new contract on different
terms, an ordinance is required. In Gilmore v. Borough, 15 W. N. C. 342, it is
laid down that a town council cannot by
mere resolution take land in widening a
street. Many other cases could be cited to
the same effect.
In the present case council authorized
the making of the contract merely by a
motion passed. This action, in the absence of an ordinance for the making of
such contract, we think, was insufficient.
The contract was for the purchase of machinery, costing $2,000; the debt was pay-

able in five years with interest. It was a
contract for the expenditure of public
money and of no small amount. It was a
contract of an unusual and important
kind, and one involving the expenditure
of'public money; it could, therefore, be
made solely by ordinance. Since it was
not so made, it is invalid and does not bind
the borough.
With regard to the other defense set up,
involving the question whether one council by its purchase can bind a future council
to pay for it, we need say little, for, since
the contract is invalid, it is nor any more
binding upon a future council than it would
have been upon the one making it. We
desire to say, however, that the defense is
not supported by authority. If, in this
case, the contract had been regularly and
properly made by ordinance, it would have
been binding upon the borough. And any
future council would have been obliged to
pay for it, whether it approved of the action
of the council that made the purchase or

not.
Judgment is accordingly rendered in
favor of the defendant.
WDr. A. SHOmO, P. J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The expenditure of $2,000 by a borough
is unusual. The resolution of the borough
to make it can be taken only by its lawmaking body, and that is composed of the
council and the burgess. A resolution of
the former, to make the expenditure, catinot bind the borough, unless it is submitted
to the burgess for approval, and is approved
by him, or is re-enacted after his veto. Cf.
Milford Borough v. Milford Water Co.,
124 Pa. 610.
The contract was actually made by the
committee, and the crusher was obtained.
It has been used and is still retained by
the borough. But if the contract could
not be validly made, except in the mode
described, the receipt and use of the object
of the contract cannot give validity to it.
The borough now electing to discard the
contract, the crusher remains the property
of the plaintiff. The borough haj had the
use of it for some time and will be liable,
probably, to the plaintiff for a fair compensation for that use. The law will feign
a contract in order to work an equitable
result. A contract to hire the crusher for
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the time of its actual use could have been
made without the formality of an ordinance. To feign a contract is not, therefore, an evasion of the principle that the
contract of purchase for $2,000 can be made
only by ordinance, in whose enactment
the burgess participates.
The second objection to a recovery, viz:
that one council cannot bind its successor
is pointless. One legislature can bind its
successor by an act which is a contract in
the sense that the successor cannot repeal
and extinguish the contract. The council,
as agent of the borough, may bind the
borough by a contract, and its successors
are not able to unbind the borough. rn
this sense one council can bind another.
The learned court's quotation from Riche
v. Lansford Borough, 5 D. R. 555, 5.59,was
doubtless a labor-saving device. It would
have been more satisfactory had the cases
cited in it been examined by the court for
itself.
Judgment affirmed.

SHoito and WILSON for defendant.
Defendant's act was not the natural and
prox.imate cause of the injury, therefore he
is not liable. Fairbanks v. Kerr & Smith,
70 Pa. 86 ; Hoag et al. v. R. R. Co., 147 Pa.
40; Swansan v. Crandall, 2 Sup. 85;
Pass. R. R. Co. v. Trich, 117 Pa. 390.
Defendant must owe a duty to be held.
Norris v. Brown et al., III N. Y. 326.
There was no privity of contract. Stone
v. Uniontown Water Co., 4 Dist. Rep. 431.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In the case at bar there seems to be utter,
lack of evidence that the plaintiff in this
action in ay way contributed toward the
cause of the injury complained of, and
therefore, as the existing conditions are
such that a right of action exists, we are
of opinion that the amount of damages
must be left to the jury.
The defendant, for a valuable consideration, undertook the duty of nursing a
smallpox patient during his illness. In
doing this defendant, who must be presumed to be a man capable of successfully
executing any contractof this kind which
he might make, provided he gave it his
FORPAUGH vs. WOOD.
personal attention, placed himself under
Negligence-Spread of contagious disease obligation, and owed a duty to the public
as well as to the aforesaid patient. To the
-Liability of nurse.
patient he owed the moral duty of using
the best judgment he possessed, exercising
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
the highest degree of skill with which he
The defendant, for a valuable considerawas endowed, and the greatest care and
tion, undertook the duty of nursing a
precaution of which he was capable. He
smallpox patient during his illness. In
owed the further legal duty of exercisperformance of his contract the defendant
ing such care and precaution as one ordinegligently provided an incompetent asnarily skilled in the art or business to
sistant, who allowed the patient, while dewhi h he held himself out, would use
lirious, to escape. It was known to defendunder the existing circumstances. This
ant that persons thus affected would be
applies to every act which he may comunit
likely to escape if care was not exercised.
in the performance of his contract.
Owing to the attendant's negligently fallIn pursuance of said contract, defendant
ing asleep the patient escaped, and infected
employed an assistant; in doing this dethe plaintiff, who now seeks to recover in
fendant was bound to exercise due care and
damages.
judgment so as not to select one who was
WILLIS and SMrITH for plaintiff.
incompetent, for a master will be held liaMaster is liable for injuries caused by
ble for injuries caused by his servant's
negligence of servant. 20 Am. & Eng.
negligence if said injuries are caused while
Eucyc. of Law (2nd ed.), 163.
Employer must use ordinary care in the
said servant is acting within the scope of
selection of his employees, and if he ftils
his employment. (20 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
to do so, is answerable for his neglect of
of Law, 2nd ed., p. 163, and authorities
duty. Huntingdon R. R. Co. v. Decker,
there cited). It appears in this case that
84 Pa. 423.
A railroad company which undertakes
the aforesaid servant was incompetent; if
to care for an employee suffering from
the master knew of this incompetency at
smallpox, and negligently permits him to
the time of the employment he is prima
escape, is liable to those he infects while
facie liable for the result of any negligent
at liberty. R. R. Co. v. Wood, 56 L. R.
A. 592.
act which the servant might commit; if,
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on the other hand, he did not know of the
incompetency at the time of the employnent, he was bound to exert himself in
making inquiry and investigation as to the
servant's competency, and if the master.
failed so to do, he was guilty of negligence.
In Huntingdon & Broad Top Railroad Co.
v. Decker, in Error, 84 Pa. 4213, Mr. Justice
Sterrett, delivering the opinion, said: "An
employer is bound to use ordinary care in
the selection of his employees, and if he
neglects to do so * * * he is auswerable * * * for his negligence." * * *

It was known to the defendant that persons thus afflicted would be likely to escape
if care were not exercised. We are of
opinion that defendant's liability would
not be lessened whether he was cognizant
of this fact or not, for when he understood
the work to be that of nursing the patient
through his illness, defendant held himself
out as one skilled in the art; and therefore
is primarily liable for any wrongful act of
omission or commission in the performance
of his duties in the fulfillment of his contract.
The second duty that the defendant in
this action owed was to the public. To it he
owed the duties of exercising such due care,
precaution and vigilance as would prevent
thespreador contagionof thediseaseamong
the members of society. He must not negligently give the patient an opportunity to
infect the public or any one of it, and when
he does so by negligently falling asleep, thus
allowing the patient to escape, whether
the overt act is committed by defendant in
this action himself, or by one of his employes employed to prevent that very occurrence as well as to assist in the convalescence of the patient, he is liable in damages for his employe's or his own lack of
care. Did defendant so exercise his vocation as to be free from fault in this regard?
We think not.
It was urged on us by one of the learned
counsel for the defense that where there is
no privity of contract between the parties
the one owes no duty to the other, wherefore the plaintiff in this action should not
be entitled to recover. Such is notthelaw
as we understand it. Every man, in the
performance of any trade, art or business,
owes the duty to the public to so conduct
that trade, art or business as to forbear the
reckless, careless or negligent injuring of
any person, either directly or indirectly.

We are of opinion that the decision in
Railroad Co. v. Wood, in Error, 56 L. R.
A. 592, has a direct bearing on the case at
bar, and that the adjudication of that case
is applicable in this cause. Thisis a case of
a railroad company undertaking to care
for and treat one of its employes suffering
from smallpox, and in so doing negligently
permitted him to escape. The company
was held liable to persons to whom he
communicated the disease while he was at
liberty. It was there held that when the
duty to prevent the spread of a contagious
disease rests upon a private corporation or
person, an obligation arises in favor of
each member of the community and a right
of action exists in favor of him who suffers
from its breach.
The question of remote and proximate
cause as bearing on the decision of this
case is not of sufficient importance to warrant an extended discussion on it.
We must therefore leave the question of
damages to the jury.
GILLESPIE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

With whom the defendant undertook to
nurse the patient does not appear. We
assume that it was with the patient himself, or with one who had proper charge of
him while he was sick. The defendant
was then legally able to so control the
patient as to prevent his coming in contact,
when delirious, with other persons. Was
it his duty to exercise this power?
If he had similar power over a dangerous
animal or a diseased animal, it would be
his duty to exert it. If he had such power
over his child, he would be under a similar
duty. The difference between responsibility for the adult smallpox patient and
responsibility for a savage dog, or diseased
cow, or child, consists in the difference of
the facts which create the legal power of
control. That control existing, there can
be no difference in regard to the obligatoriness of its exercise.
Wood employed an assistant, and it was
the inattentiveness of this assistant that
led to the escape of the patient, and the
infection of the plaintiff with the disease.
Whether, had theassistant been competent,
and had his selection been without negligence, Wood would have been liable for
his act, w6 shall not consider. The fact is
that the assistant was incompetent, and

THE FORUM
that the defendant "negligently provided"
him. We see no reason for doubting the
propriety of imputing the negligence of
the assistant to Wood himself.
Judgment affirmed.
IN RE BARBARA KOEDEL'S WILL.
Misnomer in a will of a legatee-Admissibility of parol evidence to explain the intention of the testator-Parolevidence
admissible to explain a latentambiguity
-Definition of a latent ambiguity.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

And all the rest, residue and remainder
of my real and personal estate, I direct,
shall be divided into 13 equal parts, and
distributed as follows: She gives 12shares
to nephews and nieces, and the 13th share
to the children of my deceased nephew,
Charles Vogel, in equal parts, share and
share alike.
Charles Vogel was alive when the will
was made, and still survives; is childless.
The testatrix had a nephew, John Vogel,
who was dead when the will was made,
and left three children to survive him,
who are living.
Mrs. Koedel stated, after making her
will, that she had provided for all the
nephews for whom she had been a godmother, and that she had acted as such for
her nephew, John Vogel.
VASTINE and CISNEY for plaintiff.
Parol evidence is admissible to explain
an ambiguity in the designation of the devisee. Dugan's Estate, 24 W. N. C. 287;
Wagner's Appeal, 43 Pa. 102.
A misnomer of the legatee will not invalidate the provision or defeat the intention of the testator, if either from the will
or material dehors the will, the object of
the testator's bounty, can be ascertained.
Brownfield v. Brownfield, 12 Pa. 136 ; Defever v. Defever, 59 N. Y. 434 ;Howard's
Estate, 29 W. N. C. 460 ; Gilmore's Estate,
154 Pa. 52-3.
CORE and MILLER for defendant.
The plaintiffs cannot take, as they are
not sufficiently described in the will, owing
to the patent ambiguity of the words of the
bequest. Packer's Appeal, 17 Phila. 450;
Newill's Appeal, 24 Pa. 199.
Theambiguity is patent, as it is in the
words themselves. McDermott- v. Ins.
Co., 8 S. & R. 607; Hiscock v. Hiscock, 5
M. & W. 607.
The presumption is, that from her signing she knew the contents of the will.
Lewis v. Lewis, 6 S. & R. 495; Lay v.
Kennedy, 1 W. & S. 299.

AUDITOR'S REPORT.

The determination of the question in this
case depends upon the construction of the
words of a devise in the will of Barbara
Koedel. By her will she devised the 13th
share of her real and personal estate to the
children of her deceased nephew, Charles
Vogel, in equal parts, share and share
alike. Charles Vogel is still alive, and is
childless. The testatrix had a nephew,
John Vogel, who was dead when the will
was made, and had children. The children of John Vogel, and the residuary legatees, each claim that they are entitled to
this 13th share.
The intention of the testator is the prevailing consideration in applying all rules
of construction. It is the intention of the
testator expressed in the will that is to
govern; and parol testimony to show what
were the actual testamentary intentions,
such as his declarations to show what he
meant to do, is admissible only to determine which of several persons or things
was intended under an equivocal description. Hiscock v. Hisdock, 5 M. & W. 362;
Wagner's Appeal, 43 Pa. 102; Porter's Appeal, 94 Pa. 332.
It appears that in all other cases parol
evidence of what waQ the testator's intention ought to be excluded, upon the ground
that his will ought to be made in writing;
and if his intention cannot be made to appear by the writing, explained by circumstances, there is no will. In many cases
it is stated that parol evidence is admissible in all cases of latent ambiguity (Neweli's Appeal, 24 Pa. 199; Townsend v.
Townsend, 25 Ohio 477; Lanning v. Sisters of St. Francis, 35 N. J. E. 392); but in
these cases it is not decided that evidence
of the testator's intention ought to be received, but that where the words of the
devise, in their primary sense, when applied to the circumstances of the family
and the property, make the devise insensible, collateral facts may be resorted to, in
order to show that in some secondary-sense
of the words-and one in which the testator meant to use them-the devise may
have full effect.
The question now arises, "was there a
latent ambiguity in this case, where the
words apply equally to two persons?" "A
latent ambiguity is one which does not
appear on the face of the instrument."-
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Bovier's Dictionary. From the face of the
will, in this case, there does not appear to
be any ambiguity; but the testatrix expressly declared that "the thirteenth
share should go to the children of her deceased nephew, Charles Vogel." This description would be applicable to the children of Charles Vogel; but it appears that
Charles Vogel is still living and has no
children, but that there was a John Vogel,
who is a deceased nephew, and has children living; this description applies likewise to these children. Therefore, this is
a latent ambiguity where the words apply
equally to two different parties. Mrs.
Koedel stated after making her will "that
she had provided for all tie nephews for
whom she had been a god-mother, and
that she had acted as such for her nephew
John Vogel." This evidence, which would
be admissible under the above decisions
to determine which of two persons were
meant, would tend to prove that the testatrix intended the thirteenth share to go to
the children of John Vogel.
The claim of the residuary legatees must
be refused and the legacy awarded to the
children of John Vogel.
EDISON B. WILLIAMSON,
Auditing Judge.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The testatrix gave one thirteenth of her
estate "to the children of my deceased
nephew Charles Vogel, in equal parts,
share and share alike." This nephew
was, when the will was written, and still
is, alive and childless. There had been a
nephew, John Vogel, who, when the will
was written, was deceased, and whom three
children then survived and yet survive.
We understand that there was only one
nephew, John, who was dead leavingchildren, and whose children had not been
elsewhere in the will provided for. That
being the case, John's children answer the
description in all respects except the name
of their father. T-Phey are the children of
a dead nephew. They are the children of
the only dead nephew whom, in this
clause, the testatrix could have had in
mind. It is pcssible, there'fore, to reject
the name Charles as a manifest misnomer,
since Charles is not dead, and since further
he has no children, and to apply the rest
of the description. Cf. Wagner's Appeal,
43 Pa. 102; Vernor v. Henry, 8 V. 385,
Brownfield v. Brownfield, 12 Pa. 136.

Had there been two nephews, John and
Charles, both dead and both leaving children, it would not be permissible to show
that there was a mistake in the name for
the purpose of taking the gift from Charles'
children and bestowing it on John's. Cf.
Appel v. Byers, 98 Pa. 479; Root's Estate,
187 Pa. 118; Green's Appeal, 42 Pa. 25i
Washoff v. Dracourt, 3 W. 240; Thompson
v. Kaufman, 9 Super. 305. Powell v. Biddie, 2 Dal]. 70, which held that facts could
be proven to show that a legacy to Samuel
Powell was intended to be to William
Powell, is over-ruled. Appel v. Byers,
supra; Root's Estate, supra.
Had there been two dead nephews, leaving children, it would have been necessary
to discover the children of which of them
the testatrix intended. Tile language of
the will would furnish no clue. The applicability of the description, except the
name, to two, would have made a latent
ambiguity, the resolution of which would
have been necessary in order to make the
gift effectual. If it had appeared that for
the two dead nephews she had acted as
god-mother, there is nothing by which it
could be determined of which of these she
intended the children to take. Evidence
was offered that testatrix said, after making the will, "that she had provided in it
for all the nephews for whom she had been
god-mother, and that she had been such
for John Vogel." Her declaration could
hardly be evidence of the fact thatshe had
been god-mother for John and for none
other than those made beneficiaries in the
will. It may be accepted as evidence,
however, that she believed she had been
god-mother for John and for none other
than those remembered in her will, and
that she intended by it to provide for all
her nephews who had been her god-children. It is her belief that explains the
bequest, not the fact. Since she believed
John was a god-child, and since she believed that in her will she had provided
for all her god-children, and since she had
not provided for John unless the gift to
Charles' children was meant by her and
supposed by her to be a gift to John's children, this belief assists in resolving the
ambiguity.
Appeal dismissed.

THE

FORUM

In the case at bar the counsel for defense
seems tobeof the opinion that the Orplhans'
Trespass-Liabilityof an estate to dam- Court has no jurisdiction. We shall take
(agcs for libel committed by t-tator-- up this question first. Common law courts
Jurisdition of the orphans' courthave jurisdiction to li(luidate the anount
Abatement of actions-Probatingof the due creditors of a decedent. But these
will not a publication of its contents by
creditors may waive the right of trial by
the testalor.
jury and submit their claims to the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court. As wassaid
by 2%1r. Justice Green in the case of Phillips
STATE31ENT OF TIE CASE.
v. Allegheny Valley R. R. Co: "The power
fn orphans' court the petitioner claims
to decide all questions necessary to a proper
damrages against the estate of James Robindistribution of the fund follows the power
son, deceased, upon the following grounds:
of distribution, and rests in the Orphans'
That the testator inserted in his will matCourt as a necessary incident to the jurister which was clearly libelous as to the
diction. Each claimant or creditor has a
petitioner, that thesaid libel was published
right to appear and to be heard so far as
by the probate of the will, and that the remay be necessary for the protectionl of his
sult was great injury to the said petitioner,
interests."
an attorney, by the imputation thus perLooking at the petitioner in this case as
petuated in a public record.
a claimant who may, or may not, have a
KitESS and MowRY for plaintiff.
good cause for damages against the estate
The right of action did not abate, beof Mr. Kersler, we are of the opinion that
cause the libel was not committed until
this court, has jurisdiction to decide the
after the decedent's death. In re Gallagher's Estate, 49 P. L. J. 161.
case at bar.
In cases of this nature creditors may
As we stated in the beginning, the case
waive the right to a tiial by jury, and subis one of the first of its kind conling before
mit their claims to the adjudication of the
the courts. So we shall have to base our
orphans' court. In re Gallagher's Estate,
decision more o our own opinion tihan
supra.
from any learning we can gleam from the
CLAcYCO.MB and KEELOR for defendant.
books. If we make a mistake tie Suprenme
A decedent's estate is not a person, and
therefore cannot be held for a tort comCourt will set us right.
mitted by the testator.
The defense further claims that tlie act
Executors and administrators can be
of
Feb. 24, 1834, is a bar to this action. In
held in all personal actions, except for
support of this contention they refer us to
slander, libel and wrongs done to the person. Act Feb. 24, 1838, sec. 38.
the case of Grim v. Carr's adn's, 7 Casey
This ac'ion did not survive at common
533. The Act of Feb. 24, 1834, provides
law, and in order to show that an action
among other things that power is given to
can now be maintained, it is necessary to
personal representatives to prosecute all
show a statute changing the common law.
Moe v. Lynn, 23 W. N. C. 461.
actions which the decedent. whom they
represent, might have prosecuted, "except
OPINION OF THE COURT.
actions for slander, libel and wrongs done
The case before us for our decision is
to tie person." The last clause of the act
peculiar in many respects. It involves a
provides they shall be liable to be sued in
principle of law, which on only one occaall actions, except as aforesaid, which
sion, has been adjudicated by the Courts.
might lave been maintained against such
This was a case that arose in the courts of
decedent if lie had lived. At common law
Alleghany County and a report of which
this cause of action would have died with
is contained in 49 Pittsburg Law Journal
the defendant. "Actio personalis moritur
161. Judge Hawkins, who wrote the
cumpersona," and if it be for a"wrong dove
opinion in that case, was of the opinion
to the person," it died notwithstanding the
that the petitioner had good grounds for a
statute.
recovery in damages. But as we were
But we think the case at bar differs from
unable to obtain a report of the case, we
the above cases.
Here no wrong was
are in doubt as to the reasoning employed
committed by testator during his life; exby the learned court in arriving at their
cept, perhaps, the witnesses may have
decision.
IN RE KERSLER.
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read the will and hence there would have
been a publication -preceding the testator's
death, but of this we have no knowledge.
As stated above the act provides that no
suit shall be prosecuted against an administrator or executor for slander, libel or
wrongs done to the person by the decedent.
Hence the question arises: Does the act
apply only to cases where the wrongs were
committed by a decedent during his life
time, or may it include cases, like the one
at bar, where the wrong was done after the
decedent's death ? We are of the opinion
that the act simply provides for a wrong
committed by or against the decedent during the said decedent's life time and cannot
apply to an act committed by the decedent
after his death. It appears that the decedent knowing the law, and feeling himself and his estate secure from all consequences attending the infamous matter
published by probate of his will, took this
unfair way of harming the petitioner, and
hoped to escape the consequences. But
we take a different view of the matter.
An attorney's name is his dearest treasure,
in a legal way, and if he loses it by such
means as the one employed in the case at
bar,we are of the opinion that he is entitled
to damages for such loss. The danger to
the legal profession, if we were to decide
otherwise, would be enormous.
Such
people as decedent could take advantage
of any one, and by printing infamous
matter in their wills ruin many an honest
man, who may have before led a life of
honesty and integrity. We take this view
not only from a consideration of the principle involved, but the construction of the
Act of Feb. 24, 1834, which we think relates
to wrongs and libels committed during
decedent's life. We can see no other possible way to construe the act than by giving
it this interpretation. Judgment is accordingly entered for petitioner to the amount
of damages he has suffered by such publication of the will of the deceased.
L. B. C. DELANEY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

A libelous statement was inserted in his
will by Robinson. So far as appears, it
was shown to nobody during his life. He
died, therefore, innocent of any libel, for
there is no libel in simply thinking derogatory thoughts of another or in expressing in writing, not shown to another,

these derogatory thoughts. The writing
must be published.
Robinson wrote the libelous words in his
will. He knew that this will would be inoperative unless it was seen by the register
and the legatees. He evidently intended
that the libel should be published after his
death. But the intention that a libel shall
be published post mortem, and even the
preparation for its publication, are not a
publication.
Had Robinson actually published this
libel by showing the will to others, no
action could be sustained against his executor. At common law the maxim actio
personalis moritur cum persona would
have applied, and it is permitted still to
apply in regard to slander, libel and
wrongs to the person, by the 28th section
of the Act of Feb. 24, 1834, 1 P. & L. 1492.
It would be remarkable to deny to
Kersler a remedy, after Robinson's death,
for a libel committed just before it, and to
allow a remedy for the same libel planned
before it, but not consummated until after
it. If the completed action would so far
have perished with him that no suit could
be sustained for it, surely the inichoate
action, the preparation for a post mortem
libel, has equally perished.
There are cases where the right of action
arises after the death of a party and his
estate can be made liable. They are
usually cases of contract, the breach of
which occurs after his death. We do not
now recall any instances in which a liability, other than for contract, has first
come into existence after the death of the
person liable.
The law does not give the expected or
desired remedy for all sorts of social and
moral wrongs. The distinction between
contract and tort is deep, and only to a
limited degree are moral and social torEs
converted into legal torts with any f6rm
of redress. The redress is often narrowly
conditioned so as to leave many cases
remediless. As there is no compensation
for a libel not recovered before the libeler's
death, it is no greater hardship to deny to
the sufferer compensation for a libel, for
whose consummation after death, preparation had been made before death.
The publioeaion of a defamatory writing
is a libel. The publisher of the will was
the person who, discovering it, exhibited
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it to the register or to some other person.
Whether, for the sake of realizing the benefit to himself under the will, the executor,
or legatee or devisee may publish it with
impunity, we are not called on here to decide. Perhaps he cannot. Perhaps, if he
takes the advantages of the will, he must
take them cum onere of responsibility for
the mischief incidental to their appropriation.
The testator is not, in any true sense,
the publisher of his will. He wrote it, and
allowed it to remain in existence until his
death. The consequence is, that some oiie
else has seen and read it. But this fact,
that after his death another has seen it,
cannot be described as a publication by
him. He is dead. He has ceased to act.
All agencies created by him have terminated. To have allowed to survive him a
paper, which, if seen, will injure another,
is not the same thing as to publish that
paper in his lifetime; and if it were, the
action for it "moriretur cum persona."
If there was a cause of action against the
decedent, or his estate, we doubt not that,
as the learned court below has said, the
orphans' court would have jurisdiction.
It distributes the estate, and must decide
who are entitled as creditors or otherwise.
Our attention has been directed to In re
Estates of Rev. 0. P. Gallagher, deceased,
49 P. L. J. 161, in which a similar question
was considered. The will of a priest of
the R. C. Church stated that "Patrick J.
Brady * * * owes me more than $3,000
for educating, clothing and otherwise
maintaining him for ten years in the College of Loretto and Emmitsburg, Md. He
often promised to pay that debt, yet never
paid a dollar of it. I now solemnly declare that I refuse to relieve him from the
obligation of payment in full, and I hereby
will and bequeath the whole amount mentioned above to James Corcoran and
Michael Gallagher, in equal shares, and
to their heirs. Both are full cousins of
mine, and the first is Brady's uncle. However, I direct that said devisees shall collect the above debt themselves, and that
the same shall not be included in the inventory of the estate assets, nor shall my
executor be in anywise accountable for the
non-collection thereof." Pending the audit
on the accoqnt of the executor, Brady, a
resident of Ohio, petitioned the court for

leave to prove his claim for $50,000 damages. The orphans' court, Hawkins, P.
J., held, (1) that the orphans' court had
jurisdiction ; (2) that the right of action
did not abate, because the libel was not
committed until after the decedent's
death; that the injury is inflicted from
time to time, for an indefinite period,
whenever anyone happens to read the
will; and there ought to be redress. The
court conditioned Brady's right to be
heard on his undertaking to pay any
money that the investigation might show
that he owed. Possibly this condition
has never been complied with. The decision of the court was but interlocutory.
Notwithstanding our respect for Judge
Hawkins, we are not constrained by his
argumentation. People who see the will,
will know that its language was used by
one who would be beyond reach of the
law when it should be read by others.
They will doubtless make allowance for
this circumstance. We are not convinced
that if a man in his life should publish a
libel in a book which lives after him, he
will be considered to create the libel after
his death, and entitle the person libeled to
post mortem redress.
Brady should not have been allowed to
take advantage of the death of Rev. Mr.
Gallagher as he would be if permitted to
make the claim, since the burden of proving the truth of his statements would be
on decedent, or his executor. It is not an
unwise law that forbids to a libeled person
any redress after the death of the libeler,
for that death may remove the evidence of
the truth of the libel, and thus enable the
person libeled not only to be as bad as the
libel represented him, but to gain a reward
for being truthfully declared to be so.
Decree reversed.

GOODMAN vs. WESSELS.
Assumpsit-Parol unilateral contractSuspension of broker without noticeLiability on contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Wessels told Goodman to find him a
buyer for his house, and that if he did so
he would pay him $75 00; that the price
must be not less than $3,500. Goodman
spoke to Wallace about the house and told
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him to see Wessels. He did so, offering
but $3,000. Wessels declined. Two or
three other interviews occurred until Wallace consented to pay $3,500; paid it, and
received the deed. He also paid $25.00,
which Wessels said he would have to pay
Goodman.
Wessels paying Goodman
nothing, this is assumpsit for the $75.00.
RIFE and RENO for the plaintiff.
A broker is one whose business it is to
bring buyer and seller together. Key v.
Johnson, 68 Pa. 43.
A broker becomes entitled to his commission whenever he procures for his
principal a party with whom he is satisfied,
and who actually contracts for the purchase of the property at a price acceptable
to the owner. Key v. Johnson, supr-a;
Clendenon v. Pancoast, 75 Pa. 213; Pratt
v. Patterson, 112 Pa. 479; East v. Cummins, 54 Pa. 394; Hepple v. Laird, 189 Pa.
472.
KAUFMAN, D., and IN[CNEAL for defendant.
The contract was not executed; the Ercceptance was not identical with the terms
of the offer. White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y.
467.
A conditional offer is not a contract.
Clark on Contracts, 7.
Plaintiff cannot recover a commission
because he did not find a purchaser able,
ready and willing to purchase on the terms
offered. Hester v. McNeille, 6 Phila. 234.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant entered into a parol unilateral contract with the plaintiff. Upon
the performance of certain conditions, the
finding of a buyer,,and a consequent sale
at a stipulated price, the defendant was to
be bound to pay the plaintiffS75.00.
The defendant was not limited to a sale
through the plaintiff's efforts, but was
free to sell himself independently, or by
other brokers. The plaintiff found a prospective purchaser, and brought the parties together; but the one found offered
$500.00 less than the stipulated price. The
owner refused to accept the offer. Up to
this point the defendant was clearly not
bound by the performance not in accordance with the conditions.
No time was fixed within which performance must be completed (Clarendon
v. Pancoast, 75 Pa. 213) ; there was no revocation of the agent's privilege (Sibald v.
Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 390) ; but
the defendant owner, without any notice
to the broker, superseded him and carried
the negotiations to completion, after two

or three interviews upon the terms specified. Thus, under the most unfavorable
interpretation of the offer to the broker,
the owner prevented by his own act a tender of full performance, and at the same
time utilized the efforts of the plaintiff in
procuringthepurchaser. Underthese circumstances the plaintiff can maintain his
action on the contract for his commissions.
Algeo v. Algeo, 10 S. & R. 235; Harris v.
Leggits, 1 W. & S. 301 ; Albert v. Frick,
1 Penny. 139; Shaw v. Turnpike Co., 2 P.
& W. 454. In the latter case Justice Gibson states the rule thus: "When a contract is entire, before recovery can be had
of the consideration money the plaintiff
must prove that he has performed, or is
ready to perform, his part of the contract,
or that the performance was prevented by
the defendant." InSatterthwaite v. Vreeland, 3 Hun. 152, Judge Daniels, applying
the general rule to brokerage contracts,
says: "To maintain a claim by the broker
for his commissions, it was necessary that
he should be able to show that he had
either procured a purchaser for the property at the price for which he was empowered to sell, or that the defendant had deprived him of the opportunity to do so
while the privilege lasted."
There is no doubt that the case under
consideration comes within the above
rules, and that a recovery may be had in an
action on the contract for as much as may
be justly due. When the owner converted
the efforts of the broker to his own use he
clearly prevented further action upon the
broker's part.
It now remains to inquire whether, uinder the law, the broker has earned his full
commission. In the leading case of Keys
v. Johrison, 68 Pa. 42, an analogous case,
which has been universally followed in
Pennsylvania, Justice Sharswood says:
"If the broker procures a person with
whom a bargain is made upon any terms,
he is entitled to his commission, unless
there is something special in the contract
of employment, or the circumstances of the
case, to preclude him." And this is practically the English rule, stated in Wilkinson v. Martin, 8 C. & P. 1, as follows: "If
the introduction is the foundation on
which the negotiation proceeds, and without which it would not have proceeded,
then the parties cannot by their agree-
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ment deprive the brokers of their just remuneration."
In Workman v. Cullberg, 12 W. N. C.
189, it is said that "The commissions of a
broker are earned when he brings buyer
and seller together, who are at liberty to
conclude their own contracts; which become satisfactory to both parties." See
also Jackson v. Carrick, 25 W. N. C. 132;
Jackson v. Market Co., 12 W. N. C. 190;
Haines v. Bequer, 9 Phila. 50; Gibson's
Estate, 14 C. C. 241; Michner v. Beirn, 20
Phila. 227.
The rule seems to be that when all owner
accepts the buyer, but refuses his first
offer, yet proceeds to negotiate with him
until they agree, and a sale results, the
owner is bound to pay the stipulated
commission, the broker being deemed the
procuring, if not the immediate cause of
the sale; unless the owner is able to show
that the buyer himself had abandoned the
purchase, (Eart v. Cummings, 54 Pa. 394);
or that the time limited for performance
had passed, (Clarendon v. Pancoast, 75 Pa.
213; Reed's Executors v. Reed, 82 Pa. 425);
or that the privilege was not exclusive,
and he had sold to other parties, (McClure
v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 562); or no notice of acts
of broker to allow a ratification, (Twelfth
Street Market Co. v. Jackson, 102 Pa. 273);
or that the party proposed was already negotiating, (Hartley v. Anderson, 150 Pa.
391); or that the broker's privilege had been
revoked, (Vincent v. Oil Co., 165 Pa. 402).
In the present case no provision of the
contract nor any of the evidence shows any
condition or circumstance to make an exception to the rule; but, on the other hand,
the fact that the buyer paid money to the
owner for brokerage is affirmative evidence
that he still considered himself as acting
under the procurement of the plaintiff,
and the previous refusal by the owner to
accept $3,000 was not a withdrawal of his
offer-to the broker. Andq, in the absence
of any notice of revocation, the broker was
not bound to interrupt the proceeding between the owner and the buyer, and to
deny the owner's right to supersede him
in the negotiations, to his own probable
detriment, in order to protect himself in
the future recovery of his commissions.
To subject brokers to such an interpretation of their contracts would make it easy
for an owner to defraud his broker when-

ever he saw fit to take the negotiations out
of his broker's hands before completion of
the sale.
The offer on the part of the owner to the
plaintiff in the present case may be susceptible of a construction more favorable
to the plaintiff than the one upon which
we have proceeded; but we have concluded
that even under .the construction most
favorable to the defendant the plaintiff is
fairly entitled to the full amount of his
commissions, and it is unnecessary to discuss that phase of the case.
A verdict is therefore directed for the
plaintiff for $75 and costs.
W. L. HoucK, J.
ADAM HARMER vs. PHILIP

STROUSE.
Mortgage-Prior lien-When
dates its lien.

mortgage

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Strouse executed to James Thompson a
mortgage to secure bonds that Strouse intended to issue to the number of ten. Two
months after the execution of the mortgage
he found Harmer, who bought one bond
for $900. It was three months before he
found Smith, who paid $850 for bond No. 2.
No other bonds were ever issued or disposed of. Harmer sued on his bond, and
obtaining judgment, served an execution
and sold the mortgaged premises. The
mortgage purported to be to secure ten
bonds in the hands of such as should from
time to time lend money on them to
Strouse. Before the sale of the first bond to
Harmer, but after the recording of the
mortgage, Win. Harrison obtaineda judgment for $1,700 against Strouse. Thle proceeds of the sheriff's sale, $2,350, are
claimed by Harmer and Smith in preference to Harrison.
FLYNN and CHAPMAN for plaintiff.
Mortgage may be given to secure a contingent responsibility or a future advance.
Lisle v. Ducount, 5 Binn. 585; Garber v.
Henry, 6 Watts 57; McGregar v. Sibley,
69 Pa. 380.
Mortgage for future advances is binding
to full extent where the record gives information of the agreement and extent of
the lien. Stewart v. Stocker, 1 Watts 140.
Garber v. Henry, 6 Watts 57; Parmentur
v. Gillespie, 9 Barr 87.
A mortgage given to secure bonds and
immediately recorded ranks as a lien for
the amount loaned from the date of its
record, and not from the date of the actual
advances. Moroney's Appeal, 24 Pa. 372;
Dahlen's Estate, 175 Pa. 444.
OLDT and CooK for defendants.

A mortgage given to secure the payment
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of bonds is a lien for further advances as
against intervening encumbrances, quly
from the date of such future advances, and
not from the date of the mortgage. Mullison's Estate, 68 Pa. 212; Bank of Montgomery Co.'s Appeal, 12 Casey 170; Parker
v. Jacoby, 3 Grant 300; Bank of Commerce's Appeal, 44 Pa. 423; McClure v.
Roman, 52 Pa. 458.
A judgment on a bond, secured by a
mortgage, is not payable out of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale of the mortgaged
premises under ajuniorjudgment. Comm.
v. Wilson, 34 Pa. 63.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

At common law, except for debts due
the King, the lands of a debtor were not
liable to the lien of a judgment against
him. This, it has been said, was in accordance with the policy of the feudal 19w.
This continued to be the law until the passage of the statute (Westm. 2, 13 Edw. 1),
by which in the interest of trade and commerce the writ of elegit was for the first
time provided for. By that statute a judgment creditor was given his election to sue
out a writ of ft. fa. against the goods and
chattels of the defendant or else a writ on
which the sheriff shall deliver to him all
the chattels of the debtor, saving only his
oxen and beasts of his plow, and the onehalf of land to hold until out of rents and
profits thereof the debt be levied or until
defendant's interest expired.
Keeping abreast to the advance and pro.
gress of the business world, the scope of
judgments have gradually been extended.
By the Act of April 4, 1798, P. & L. p.
2471, a judgment was made a lieu on real
estate for a period of five years.
A judgment is not a specific lien upon
any particular real estate of the judgment

debtor, but a general lien -upon all his real
estate, subject to all priorliens, either legal
or equitable The court held in Bratton's
Appeal, 8 Pa. 164, a judgment is a lieu
from the time it is recorded or registered.
In the case at bar there appears to be no
dispute as to the question of the judgment
being a lien upon the real estate, but
whether it is to be preferred to the debt
claimed to be secured by the mortgage.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff have
cited a long line of cases in which mortgages were given to secure future advances, and in each case specific sums
were recorded.
"A mortgage may be
given as security for future advances and
responsibilities, provided the record of the
lien contains information of the extent and
certainty of it." Garber v. Henry, 6 Watts
57. Where the record gives instructions
of the agreement so that a junior creditor

may by inspection of the record and ordinary diligence ascertain the extent of the
terms. Steward v. Stocker, I Watts 140;
Garber v. Henry, supra. Where a mortgage was to secure a certain specific sum
which could be demanded when needed
during the progress of construction of a

building. Moroney's Appeal, 24 Pa. 372.
In the casb at bar there is no specific
sum mentioned as being secured by the
bonds, nor could any have been ascertained at the time of Harrison's judgment,
for no bonds had been disposed of. In
Mullison Estate, 68 Pa. 214, the court said,
"If there be no binding agreement to advance, and the rights of third parties have
intervened, then only such advances will
be covered as have been made prior to intervening encumbrances; subsequent advances only have a lien from the date of the
payment." Bank of Montgomery County's
Appeal, 36 Pa. 170. A mortgage given to
secure the payment of notes discounted
or thereafter to be discounted for the mortgagor, and all their liabilities to the mortgagee of whatsoever kind that existed or
might thereafter exist at any time, is a
lien for future advances as against intervening encumbrances only from the date
of such future advance, and not from the
date of the mortgage. Appeal of the Bank
of Commerce, 44 Pa. 423. A bank, to
which a mortgage was given as collateral
security for notes discounted, or hereafter
to be discounted, cannot as against a lien
creditor whosejudgment was subsequently
entered up, claim the proceeds of the sale
of the mortgaged property when the notes
on which claim was made under the mortgage were not given or discounted until
after the entry of the judgment.
The court is of the opinion that the bonds
given in the case at bar were intended as
future advances, and as no specific amount
was named for which the bonds were to be
sold, nor could amount be ascertained that
the mortguge was security for, the case
falls within the rule laid down in the last
line of cases cited. Therefore the Harrison
judgment will have first claim against the
proceeds of the sale.
"'A.NARD, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.

The decision of this case in the court below, was, we think, correct. A judgment
was obtained on one of the two bonds which
the mortgage secured, and upon this judgment the mortgaged premises were sold.
The mortgage was thus divested. The
proceeds of the sale were $2,350. Harrison
obtained a judgment after the execution
and recording of the mortgage, but before
the sale of the first bond. The mortgage,
at that time, was a security for nothing.
It had the power to become a security on
the subsequent sale of any bond. But as
the purchaser was under no duty to purchase, he had no interest to be protected
until he actually purchased. When he
purchased he acquired an interest in the
mortgage, but it did not, as to him, rank
as of the date of its recording, but as of the
date of his purchase.
It was proper to allow the Harrison
judgment to be paid in full, and to distribute the balance to Harmer.
Judgment affirmed.

